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Abstract: Recently, Nigeria has experienced various acts of domestic terrorism and kidnapping 
that may be rooted in many forms of motivations and agitations.  These aggressions have resulted 
in homegrown bloodshed, émigré aggression, or even organized international network assaults 
against the population.  The scourge of these terrorist activities has continued to weaken the 
Nigerian character or moral fiber.  While the government is trying to combat these offenses caused 
by extremist activities, there are still remedies that have not been implemented prudently or 
applied properly.  In this article, we propose various forms of the repertoire of actions which the 
government can use to effectively fight and combat terrorism in a democratic Nigeria.   
 
Introduction 
While, historically, West African countries have not cuddled with the kind of terrorism that 
surround Nigeria today (Onwudiwe 2001) in the face of the new contours of terrorism confronting 
the Nigerian nation and the ensuing insecurities in the country, it may be faultily deduced that 
Nigeria has failed to safeguard its internal security and therefore poses a danger for the rest of the 
African continent.  This article takes a different view and rejects any attempt to tag Nigeria as a 
failed state, rather, it underscores the need to put forward a multi-dimensional remedies that 
constitute the parameters for archiving and maintaining the security of the country.  Nigeria’s 
insecurity is a reality with the glaring evidence that stems from the Boko Haram’s infirmity. Acts 
of kidnapping, aside from terrorism and other criminalities, are also raging in Nigeria. These acts 
of terrorism and other ills have escalated since after the bombings of the World Trade Center in 
the United States on September 11, 2011 and the election of President Good Luck Jonathan in 
April 2011. Based on these trends, Nigeria’s insecurity dilemma demands different levels of 
explanations.  Nigeria is no longer immune from domestic and émigré terrorists.  Nigeria is 
vulnerable like other countries that Al-Qaida terror network targets. The insecurities in the country 
have grown even beyond the corridors of terrorism, defined as acts of violence rooted in political, 
social, religious, and cultural objectives. Today, Nigeria, especially, northern Nigerians dwell in 
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fear of kidnappings—and women and children—suffer the consequences the most.  The mission 
of this article is to articulate strategic security measures that Nigeria needs to slow the tidal wave 
of terrorism and kidnapping without engaging in explaining and defining terrorism as such 
attempts have been properly documented (Onwudiwe 2001, White 2009).  
Below, workable practical solutions are provided that have been used in other places to 
fight terrorism.  For instance, in the United States, most domestic terrorists have been prosecuted 
out of existence and have also been denied funding needed to carry out terrorist objectives (Smith 
1994).  In Britain, they have, historically, used CCTV and other technological innovations to 
control Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) mayhem and pandemonium caused by the use of terrorism 
to fight for political liberation on the English soil (White 2013).  The yearning of the French 
authorities to control terrorism stems from hard-won-lesson (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). With its 
long history of terrorism, dating back to the French revolution, France has always been on the 
“bleeding edge” of terrorism.  But in order to prevent terrorism and defend the homeland, the 
French government, unlike the United States, Britain, and Germany, embarked on and developed 
a different repertoire of actions to fight terrorism (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). This article 
examines the schemes adopted by these societies that have suffered terrorism longer than Nigeria.  
It is hoped that the strategic analysis that will be offered can be applied and be used for the security 
interest of Nigeria. However, it is important to try to ascertain the genesis of the problem that 
caused the sudden interests of some Nigerians to behave in un-Nigerian ways.  There must be some 
explanations for the rising trend of violence in the form of kidnapping and terrorism in Nigeria.  
 
Methods and the Framing of Terrorism 
Criminological theories, properly framed, can provide the context for explaining terrorism 
in Nigeria.  We begin with this contextual approach because understanding the causes of crime 
may provide the social and intellectual bedrock to recognize the bane of terrorism. Robert Agnew’s 
(2010) General Strain Theory (GST) of terrorism provides an apt elucidation of terrorism, which 
can be applied to the situation in Nigeria. Agnew (2010) insists that the GST is appropriate for 
understanding the causes of terrorism, because in GST, “strain” the main premise of the theory, or 
“grievances” that perpetrators of terrorism feel, are the main basis of terrorism. Agnew, however, 
stated that the definitional problems of terrorism are likely to affect the way that the strain theory 
is used to explain the causes of terrorism.  He argues that it is important to isolate the particular 
type of strain that actually causes terrorism. In addition, he reiterates that only a small portion of 
those affected by strain actually resort to terrorism. While other strain theories fail to isolate the 
particular type of strain that leads to terrorism, GST does (Agnew 2010).  
According to Agnew (2010), current strain theories of terrorism attribute terrorist acts to 
various grievances associated with relative material deprivation, religious and socio-cultural issues 
relating to modernization and globalization; resentment over cultural, economic and military 
domination by the United States and other Western cultures; territorial ethnic and religious 
disputes resulting from postcolonial efforts at nation building; economic, political and racial/ethnic 
discrimination; denial of basic human rights as well as political rights and personal security rights; 
harsh state repression, hence widespread violence towards certain groups; severe challenges to 
group identity (Post 2007); displacement or loss of land or home; military occupation of certain 
types. Basically, terrorist groups identify with one or more of the aforementioned grievances and 
sometimes ascribe their group names to these. When applying Agnew’s GST to the issue of 
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terrorism in Nigeria, it is apparent that previous and current acts of terrorism have been perpetuated 
by “collective groups” as described by Agnew.  Strains that are most likely to contribute to 
terrorism are those felt by members of an identified, collective group, that is, groups bound by 
race/ethnicity, religion, political affiliations or territory (Agnew, 2012).  Agnew (2012) maintains 
that the strain individual members of these terrorist groups feel lead them to terrorism as a way of 
coping with the strain they experience.  Additionally, the strain that individuals feel reduces the 
effects of social control and ties on the prevention of terrorism because the causes of the strain 
often evokes feelings of sympathy, tolerance and support. In essence, individuals commonly have 
loose ties with the source of their strain (Agnew, 2012).  
Agnew rightly states that GST is not an absolute explanation of terrorism; he lays emphasis 
that there are other social contributing factors to the developments of strain.  He suggests that a 
more complete explanation would have to include a range of theories and the complex 
relationships between them to explain the psychological contributing factors that lead to terrorism.  
GST, therefore, isolates only one of the causes of terrorism, that is, the type of terrorism caused 
by collective strain.  
In retrospect, counter-terrorism measures can be applied to terrorism caused by collective 
strain by changing policies that will have long term effects on communities that harbor the 
individuals that react to the strain they feel.  In line with this, Agnew argues that collective strain 
that leads to terrorism has serious policy implications, such as attempting to reduce the causes of 
collective strain by targeting “intervening mechanisms that link collective strains to terrorism” 
(Agnew 2012, 148).  
One other measure is by providing intervening legal channels of addressing grievances. 
Other counter-terrorism measures can be applied after examining what has been done before in 
other countries in countering terrorism caused by strain. Therefore, just as America needed new 
laws to deal with the occurrences of September 11, 2001, so also, Nigeria needs to revisit the public 
policy arena that will provide solutions for the current spate of terrorist attacks occurring in the 
country, especially those that have been identified as being caused by collective strain, such as that 
being carried out by Boko Haram.   
Tracy (2012) states that the events of September 11 placed the decision to respond to 
terrorism in order to keep the homeland safe inadvertently in the hands of the government and 
public policy arena and became the area by which the government responded.  Generally, a policy 
that will attempt to respond to the issues of terrorism in Nigeria will have to affect environmental 
and structural issues like the preparedness of local police response as it relates to the structure of 
policing the community (Tracy 2012). This is just one of the ways to counter-terrorism.   
 In fact, theoretical frameworks with which to explain the security systems in many sub-
Saharan African States are almost non-existent in the securitization policy literature. What can be 
inferred are evidence of historical colonial para-military systems for subduing and controlling 
resistance within the pre-independence indigent communities. Though in many of the more 
promising states like Nigeria and Ghana, these systems have received elaborate burnishing to 
reflect contemporary Western ideals of State security. Mabe (2009) notes quite correctly that 
security is a political principle that affects all aspects of human existence. He states that “security 
represents a principle underlying all national actions, which pursues the goal of promoting 
economic and political development.” While it may be difficult to identify the universal appeal for 
security due to the reality of a vast difference in the unique needs of the world’s multicultural 
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spatial settings, in historical African anthologies, as can be identified within some of its 
contemporary societies, securitization policies are often founded on the basis of group bonding, 
material wealth, as well as on spiritual fortification. Mabe further identified that in Africa the 
existence and belief in the concept of transcendental forces with immense power to secure 
individual and group existence and their material accumulations also possess elements of rational 
realities.        
General securitization principles of traditional African societies established the 
requirement for old age security, personal and physical security, communal/home security, soil 
security, and food security. Oral traditional African concept of security differentiates between the 
need for security based on fear, isolation, mourning and other emotive occurrences or expectations 
and security based on a reasoned consciousness for the preservation of human life (Mabe 2009). 
These dual expressions of security reflect the theories of securitization based on superstition, and 
the other that is based on rational thought. It is evident that traditional African forms of security 
elaborated the comprehensive needs of the individual members of the society to bind them to a 
form of a communal securitization agenda. These same security principles can be found in the 
provision of welfare packages that act as buffers for the socioeconomic welfare of citizens in 
contemporary Western democratic societies. However, most security principles advanced in the 
practice of sub-Saharan African governance is wholly based on physical life and material security.  
Mabe (2009) states that most forms of security arrangements in African states emanate from 
political and religious persecution, social inequality, racial and sexual discrimination, hunger and 
poverty, and hatred, envy and war.   
Thus, it is possible that some of the major security problems apparent in African societies 
today, such as, terrorism can be traced to ill-informed approaches of governments in the region 
towards fulfilling the desires of their citizens (Mabe 2009). This line of argument agrees with 
Ekanem and Simon (2012) assertions that conflicts in African states are generally a result of the 
struggle for power, values, and scarce resources.       
 For Mabe (2009), security in modern African States is rooted on the governance of 
intimidation by the few without winning the reasoned support of the citizens. This, indeed, was 
the case with the governance of apartheid South Africa, where the minority population ruled 
without the consent of the governed (see Onwudiwe 2001).  Furthermore, as Mabe insists, in spite 
of measures adopted for an establishment of a democratic culture, sub-Saharan African States often 
rule by caveats without popular and agreed plebiscites. Thus, leaving a gap of unpopular 
acceptance that could easily be leveraged by the lawless to foment trouble for the entire society. It 
must be underscored that Robert Agnew’s explanation of crime due to elements of societal strain 
can be established from these ill-developed principles of security upon which modern African 
States secure and guide their nations. In some form, it can be seen as a part abdication of the social 
contract between the State and its citizens. Thus, strain, emanates out of the crucible of the 
yearning to reach the goals of this contract for the innovative few among the citizenry and acts as 
a platform to retrieve the right to create and live within their own individual/group rules. Finally, 
Mabe (2009) submits that a theoretical framework for security in Africa must begin with the 
realization that security has a direct relationship to “dignity, liberty, and well-being.” The influence 
of totalitarian ideologies in postcolonial Africa seems to limit the realization of this ideal. Mabe 
aligns this with the decreasing level of ethical considerations in the governance of African states. 
 Tedheke and Tedheke (2012) study of the problem with the engagement of Nigerian forces 
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in global peace support operations (PSO) reveals that inadequate attention is given to develop and 
understand the theoretical foundations of those problems before formal engagement. For instance, 
Nigeria has tended to associate such peace support problems with ethnic, cultural, and sectional 
differences more than the major causal functions of structural hemorrhages due to the demands of 
Western global economy.         
 In the determination of a theoretical foundation for Nigerian security against issues of 
violent resistance and social upheavals, it is important to identify the enabling routes of violence 
in a society. According to Tedheke and Tedheke (2012), Johan Gatlung, a foundational  authority 
of the concept of structural   violence  listed three primary types of violence that would enable the 
manifestation of social upheavals: “(i) direct violence -physical, emotional and psychological 
violence; (ii) structural violence -deliberate policies and structures that cause human sufferings, 
death and harm, and (iii) cultural violence -cultural norms and practices that create discriminations, 
injustices and human sufferings.”  
Each of these three forms of violence is undeniably related to the contemporary situation 
of sectarian and terrorist violence in Nigeria. But the type most misunderstood by Nigerian security 
policy-makers and long denied by governments in Nigeria is structural violence. The theoretical 
foundation of such security policies is not unrelated to the remnants of imperial trade policies and 
the system of postcolonial Western trade hegemony, which creates sub-conscious resistance to its 
structural destabilizing effects on the poorer nations of the global South. Tedheke and Tedheke 
relate the rise of poverty and social upheavals in the southern region of the world to the need to 
adapt to Western economic philosophies and structure that has been imposed on the rest of the 
world. This includes the economic disparities created by trade between the powerful and wealthier 
nations of the world, and the poorer nations, on the one hand, and the economic disparities between 
the elites and the masses within the poorer nations. Although colonialism had played its role in the 
leadership cerebral attitudes of African leaders, we caution quietly that imperialism can no longer 
be blamed for the 21st Century African problems anymore. 
The need to adapt to the socioeconomic and political strains of these disparities has often 
resulted in violent resistance even with negative innovations such as terrorism, and kidnaping as 
currently evident in Nigeria. This pattern of PSO understanding of security is a manifestation of 
one major angle from which Nigerian authorities approach issues of internal security. Nigeria’s 
sub-imperial roles in the PSO as argued by Tedheke and Tedheke is equally operative within her 
national security governance structure. In this sense, the continuous misinterpretation of the 
fundamental situations of Nigeria security is a major problem for the development of a functional 
and enduring securitization policy for the nation. Arguably, structural economy is only a part of 
the misunderstood dynamics of violent upheavals in Nigeria as it is difficult to deny the influence 
of sectional religious indoctrination that leads to the proclivity for terrorist attacks in the Nigerian 
historical context. 
 
Genesis of Terrorism in Nigeria 
We argue that Nigerian policy-makers must understand the sources of terrorism without 
being a-historical.  Historical facts about terrorism are important if there is any hope of countering 
modern brutal nature of terrorism. Some terrorism observers have noted the importance of 
comprehending the history of a terrorist group, individual terrorists and the conditions that 
spawned them (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004). If violence leads to terrorism, then history is 
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replete with many cases of terrorism all over the globe. Terrorism seen in this context has become 
part of recorded history (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004; Parry 1976). Indeed, knowing the history 
of the evolution and contemporary forms of terrorism is a vital tool in an all-inclusive investigation 
of acts of terrorism. Without a focus on in-depth historical studies of terrorism, the Nigerian 
government can only provide a military solution to the barbaric acts of terrorism in the country. 
   The history of religion and religious radicals in all the regions as well as the political and 
economic protest groups of the country must be studied.  Moreover, Nigeria has a rich history of 
northern patterns of religious violence.  The recent surge of the Boko Haram terror is in sync with 
the historical evolution of violence with a determined base on the principles of sacramental acts 
(Hutchinson 2001; Hickey 1984; Onwudiwe 2011). Therefore, within balance and reason, an 
understanding of the history of terrorism, not only would aid policy-makers to know the genesis 
of the issue, but also would oblige the Nigerian thinkers to formulate counter approaches to the 
problem of terrorism and the defense of the Nigerian homeland. Certainly, knowing the historical 
roots of terrorism will benefit societies and their intellectual thinkers to be aware of the 
chronological episodes and practices and tactics of terrorists all over the world in order to have an 
unadulterated exposure to the laboratory of terrorists’ behavior and explanations of that behavior 
(Gagnon 1989). 
Indeed, historically, Africa has witnessed violence in the form of religion (political 
Islam/Christianity), leading to butchery or the annihilation of numerous living or lifeless objects, 
all in the context of religion (Longman 2001; Gettleman 2006). The methods of violence are rooted 
in various clichés, most notably crusades in Nigerian history, civil wars in Sudan and Darfur, and 
genocide in Rwanda. Another modus operandi may take the form of terrorism, martyrdoms, and 
sacrifices. While there are other religions that may cause human havoc in the world today, such as 
Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lanka, Africa generally is confronted by two major religions, 
Christianity and Islam. Sudan, however, presents a different scenario, in which there is a 
confrontation between Islam, sometimes Christianity, and African traditional religions. 
Christianity and Islam are religions rooted in sacred writings and can be used to serve and justify 
religious killings and oppressions. In various parts of the world today, religion is in one way or 
another associated with warfare, and Africa is not alone in this regard. Indeed, most religious 
zealots believe that their actions are approved by their gods, and are willing to kill and die for their 
political causes (Dickson 2012). The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, which claimed 
about 3,000 lives, was religiously motivated, and two countries in East Africa have experienced 
similar catastrophic havoc based on political Islam. David Dickson, in his 2005 special report for 
the United States Institute of Peace points to the impartiality of Islamism and argues that it involves 
a desire for the recruitment of followers in order to achieve certain ideological objectives such as 
the defeat of imperialism.  However, one author cautions against the demonization of Arabs and 
Muslims in the war against terrorism (Onwudiwe 2005). 
With the rise of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, one wonders if this terror group is not 
actively recruiting despondent youths as ardent supporters and active cohorts with a strong focus 
on indoctrination.  The Boko Haram must have been supported directly and indirectly by some 
elitist groups to have such an impact on Nigeria after the democratic election of President 
Goodluck Jonathan.  One must then try to identify the causes of the motivations of this religious 
adherent sect with the ability to carry out horrific acts of terrorism against the Nigerian population.  
Does the Boko Haram borrow their political acts from the Nigerian historical past?  Although it is 
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easy to blame radical religion, it may also be a truism that the same system to system factors 
(unemployment, economic marginalization, lack of equal opportunity, injustice, inadequate 
education, political corruption, pollution, inadequate electric power and good roads etc.) motivate 
groups like Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).  
This is evident from the following charts where the acts of terrorism by numbers of incidents seem 
to escalate as the years’ progress. In Charts I, II, and III adapted from the  Global Terrorism 
Database, we have identified various agitational groups that have perpetrated acts of terrorism 
against Nigeria, breaking the charts into the following timelines 1991- 2000 (10 years); 2001-2010 
(10 years); and 2011-2013 (3 years). Charts IV–VI depict fatalities by these perpetrators using the 
same timeline. The last six charts show the number of incidents by type of attacks and weapons of 
attacks using the same timelines for each group. The Global Terrorism Database (GTB) has 
collected data on world terrorism and has statistics from 1970.  It is important to note, however, 
that there was only one recorded incident between 1970 and 1980, and 5 incidences between 1981 
and 1990 for Nigeria; therefore those statistics are not included in this paper. 
 
Chart I:  Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of incidents 10 years: 1991-2000
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Chart II:  Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 10 years: 2001-2010 
 
 
 
 
Chart III:  Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 3 years: 2011-2013 
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Chart IV: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities 10 years: 1991-2000 
 
 
Chart V: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 10 years: 2001-2010 
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Chart VI: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 3 years: 2011-2013 
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Chart VII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks 10 years: 1991-2000 
 
 
Chart VIII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attack: 10 years: 2001-2010 
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Chart IX: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks, 3 years: 2011-2013 
 
 
 
Chart X: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 1991-2000 
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Chart XI: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 2001-2010 
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Chart X1I: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 3 years: 2011-2013 
 
  
The data illustrate that the three years 2011 to 2013 showed the highest numbers in terms 
of almost all the statistics.  For example, the number of terrorist incidents recorded for Boko Haram 
was 0, 27 and 776 for the three timelines 1991-2000, 2001-2010 and 2011-2013, respectively; 
while the number of fatalities by the same group recorded higher numbers: 0, 376 and 3267, 
respectively for the same timeline.  These numbers clearly show an escalation in the activities and 
fatalities by Boko Haram over the past thirteen years.  
Having made that clarity, religious turbulence in Nigeria is usually between Muslims and 
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of Usman Dan Fodio of Sokoto Caliphate. Usman Dan Fodio was a devout Fulani philosopher, a 
venerated Islamic scholar, and an avant-garde reformer. During his era, he was very popular and 
had a large following, and his jihad, unlike the religious uprising of Maitatsine, was aimed at the 
purification of Islam, not the killing of unbelievers. As a religious and political leader, he created 
a new Muslim state in northern Nigeria, known as the Fulani Empire, which was grounded in 
Islamic law. The Fulani Empire stretched across most of northern Nigeria and wielded great 
political power and influence in Nigeria and over the colonial administrators (Hickey 1984).  
 After Nigerian independence in 1960, the powerful northern Muslim elites still controlled 
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political, military, and economic power in the country. In 1966, Sir Ahmadu Bello, former premier 
of the region and the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was a devoted Muslim leader with genealogical 
affiliation to Usman Dan Fodio, was assassinated in a military coup. That assassination and the 
subsequent military rule in the nation set in motion the events that resulted in the 1980 and 1982 
religious riots. The powers of the Muslim elites were reduced, and a devout Christian General 
Yakubu Gowon became the military leader following the crisis of 1966. Moreover, the new 
constitution provided for the freedom of religion. This did not augur well with some Muslim 
prophets in the North who wanted to establish a firm Islamic state in the country. Alhaji 
Muhammadu Maroua, popularly known as Maitatsine (“He who curses others” in Hausa), 
stimulated his Isala faction to perpetrate acts of violence in Kano. This ultimately led to his death 
and also claimed the lives of 5,000 of his supporters in 1980 (Hickey 1984). It took the combined 
efforts of the Nigerian army and the air force to quell the violence. Subsequently, in 1982, in 
Maiduguri, Nigeria, the police and the disciples of Maitatsine once again engaged in a ferocious 
battle when police tried to arrest the disciples and the remaining leaders of the Maitatsine 
movement. 
  This bloody encounter led to the death of hundreds of the Maitatsine supporters. The 
Maitatsine movement still poses a serious threat in Nigeria and must not be ignored, because 
adherents of the uprising not only resist political changes in the country, but also are eager to use 
violence against moderate Muslims. In short, they dislike Western education, technological 
advancements in Nigeria, and the contamination of Islam in a worldly Nigeria. These two accounts, 
of the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio and the religious violence of Maitatsine and his cohorts, 
demonstrate that Nigeria is still a volatile society, as also evidenced by recent acts of religious 
violence in Africa’s most populated nation.  In our view, the Boko Haram ideology must be traced 
to this brief history.  We will argue below that using the military may not be the democratic means 
to prevent these religious violent formations.  Both Sharia and Christian values can function 
simultaneously in Nigeria without sporadic killings of human beings.  The separation of Church 
and State has worked well in Western societies and Nigeria must be wise enough to address the 
Sharia matter once and for all (Hickey 1984). 
 
The Sharia Issue 
Today, Sharia (Islamic law) has been introduced in more than eleven states of the thirty-
six states of Nigeria. Additionally, Sharia also has been made part of the Nigerian constitution, 
which now permits a Sharia Court of Appeals in the Nigerian polity. The spread of Sharia in 
Nigeria may be a product of Nigerian Muslims’ desire to reassert their political power in response 
to neo-southern Christian political ascendancy. On the other hand, the Christians and mixed 
religious states view Sharia as an alien religion and cultural imposition. Although Sharia exists in 
twelve states, its strongest adherents will not rest until it has engulfed the whole of Nigeria and 
beyond. The angry resistance to the spread of Sharia in Nigeria is a major cause of tension and 
violence in the country (Mahmood 1993).  
 In February and May of 2000, communal religious violence claimed the lives of 2,000 
Nigerians in Kaduna City. In 2002, a newspaper article considered to be offensive to the Prophet 
Muhammad led to another round of violence in Kaduna, which claimed the lives of 200 people. 
Christian opposition to Sharia practices in the North will continue to elevate tensions in Nigeria. 
Sharia may be an excuse, however, and not the root problem in an oil-rich nation with severe 
15
Onwudiwe et al.: In Defense of the Nigerian Homeland
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University,
103 
 
economic disasters and massive unemployment among the youth. Nigeria will continue to 
experience violence, whether from Islamic militants or from Christian fanatics, as long as there is 
growing economic marginalization of the masses and continued presence of massive poverty. 
 Violence on the scale of terrorism may also escalate in Nigeria as a result of the infusion 
of radical religious ideologies in the minds of depressed citizens. This reality ought to worry not 
only Nigeria, but also the international community. Christianity and Islam can work hand in hand, 
without constant threats and violence, although the Nigerian population is equally divided between 
the two religions. Such is not the case in Senegal, a country of 11 million people in West Africa. 
 Indeed, 94 percent of the Senegalese population are Muslims, and the country has in place 
a proper equilibrium between Islam, a material state, and modernization. As is true for their African 
counterparts, the conviviality between politicians and Muslim leaders has its origins in colonial 
administration.  If Senegal can maintain peace and tranquility among its people, Nigeria, should 
set a better example.  Nigerians deserve to live in peace without constant fear of violence regardless 
of where it originates.  However, since the problem is now endemic, it behooves the Nigerian 
intellectuals to provide proven social scientific solutions to unravel the turbulence of terrorism in 
Nigeria.  Below, we suggest various forms of the repertoire of actions for counter-terrorism and 
counter kidnapping measures to control violence and killings in Nigeria. 
 
Counter-terrorism Measures, Justice and Security in Nigeria 
It is crucial to note that terrorism, unfortunately, as we know it today, has reached Nigerian 
shores and we must, therefore, find strategic security measures to prevent it. This means that 
Nigeria is as vulnerable to terrorism as other countries in the West and the Middle East. In order 
to control terrorism, it is vital to first ascertain what is known about terrorists.  What are their 
motives and objectives? Why has Nigeria suddenly become a domestic terrorist paradise? Are 
émigré terrorists penetrating the Nigerian porous borders, and if that is the case, what can the 
authorities do about it?  Based on the extant literature, it is obvious that Boko Haram terrorists are 
motivated by religion. Although Herman (1983) in the Terror Networks insisted that state terrorism 
is the most dangerous form of terrorism, it is surmised in this article that religious motivated 
terrorists in Nigeria pose the greatest danger to the Nigerian polity and population.  This is because, 
as observed by Hoffman (1993), religious terrorists perform their terrorist operations for the grace 
of the deity and they believe that their actions are sacramental acts with forthcoming reward from 
divine providence. 
If Boko Haram and other groups in the South have demonstrated the ability to actually 
embark on the adoption of violence against the government and the population to force behavioral 
modification (Dyson 2012), law enforcement at all levels of government must have the immediate 
duty to investigate such law violations.  Terrorists are criminals, their actions are rooted in an 
ideology of violence and destruction, and violent suicide and political and economic actions are 
designed to instill fear and frighten Nigerians.  It has been reported in various Nigerian Newspapers 
and Magazines that Nigerian terrorists have used bombing tactics, kidnapping of other human 
beings, physical threats and assassinations in Nigeria. These actions and tactics are all violations 
of the Nigerian law.   
Government has the responsibility to protect its citizens. The Nigerian government through 
its intelligence and law enforcement sectors must know that some terrorists have outside financial 
funding and also supported by internal wealthy financiers. Some engage in illegal activities, such 
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as kidnapping for ransom, white collar crimes, robbery of banks and armored vehicles and 
extortions to raise funds.  Others, it has been demonstrated, also engage in the business of illegal 
importation of firearms and collusion with other illicit crime groups in order to generate funds.  
Funding is crucial for the survival of a terrorist organization. These brief tactics have been properly 
documented in the literature on terrorism (White 2009; Dyson 2012; Poland 1988) therefore, law 
enforcement officials must be familiar with them to begin to address ways to combat terrorism in 
Nigeria.   
Nigeria, like the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa, experiences turbulent violent revolutions 
primarily due to tattered economic development.  Any reasonable countermeasures to prevent 
terrorism must consider seriously the stabilization of the economy.  Generally, Africa suffers from 
violent revolutions and insurgencies because of the extreme poverty of the masses.  Scholars 
believe that negative economic development; struggle for scarce resources, inadequate health-care 
facilities, starvation of the children, tribal violence, and massive unemployment of the youth may 
create conditions ripe for terrorism (Barnett 2004; Sachs et al. 2004; White 2009). To put it in 
another context, Bell (1975) used the aphorism “endemic terrorism” in his explanation of terrorism 
in Africa.  He describes terrorism in Africa as involving artificial divisions of tribes, and ethnic 
groups.  With the situation in Nigeria today -Boko Haram menace in the North and the groups in 
the South agitating for a greater share of the nation’s resources, it is evident that Bell’s observation 
may have some roots in ethnic pursuit for reasonable distribution of resources and power.  
Just recently, the Odua People’s Congress, Odua People’s Congress (OPC)(another major 
ethnically motivated group in the country), admonished members of the terror Islamic sect, Boko 
Haram, to stay away from the South-West. Dr. Frederick Fasehun, its leader, advised the federal 
government to stop the senseless violence in the country.  He insisted that the Yoruba people 
(ethnic group) cannot be suppressed as if the Yoruba is an inferior ethnic group in the nation even 
though the Yoruba, he insisted, fought gallantly for the Nigerian independence (Sun Times 2011). 
The president of the OPC is right on the mark on the issue.  It may take regional ethnic groups to 
come out with strategic security plans to stop these sects and others from harassing and killing 
Nigerians.   
Moreover, the US State Department’s Annual Country Assessments of Global Terrorism 
stated in April 2006 that:  
‘Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups’ were present and operating in west and central 
Africa, the fund raising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaeda and affiliated 
persons and groups in Algeria, the Maghreb, Nigeria, and across the trans-Sahara region remained 
a serious concern (U.S. Department of State 2012). 
 The report lists terrorist incidents of either apprehension or collaboration in 16 African 
countries, including arrests of terrorist suspects and disruption of alleged terrorist operations in 
Kenya to recruitment activities by known al-Qaeda affiliates in Nigeria, as well as the abuse of 
travel documentation by foreigners in South Africa on US and UK terrorist alert lists. Basically, 
the information provided by the U.S. Department indicates that terrorism is not just a western 
problem. In essence, Nigeria with its large Muslim population and Christian citizens must play a 
major role in maintaining security within and beyond its boundaries.  
Developing a capacity for counter-terrorism in Nigeria and Africa as a whole requires 
cooperation among states externally and communities internally for the country to develop the 
capacity to protect its citizens from the havoc of terrorism.  Factual and practical cooperation is 
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essential in the war against terrorism within and among agencies of social control in Nigeria.  
Indeed, the U.S. departments report noted and recognized the African Union (AU) as one of the 
“essential elements” in a common front against transnational terrorism (Shillinger 2006). Nigeria 
as a major voice should not be taken by surprise after the events of September 11, 2001 in the 
United States, and subsequent incidents in East African nations of Kenya and Tanzania.  The 
Nigerian government must encourage counter-terrorism cooperation among all levels of 
governments and security agencies and the incorporation of all ethnic groups in dialogues about 
preventing terrorism. 
In our repertoire of actions, we will argue cogently that the people can provide the native 
intelligence needed to stop Boko Haram. These repertoires of actions, the core of this essay are 
framed below. The goal is to demonstrate that contrary to the view that nothing can be done 
effectively to control the spate of violence that has characterized Nigeria today, various proven 
criminological actions exist to address the terrorism quandary. 
 
Counter-Terrorism Measure I:  Law Enforcement, Detection, and Investigation 
Counter terrorism can be defined as the sum of actions and practices adopted by states and 
various nations against perceived threats and terrorist activities (Crank and Gregor 2005). In the 
case of Nigeria, these actions may be carried out by émigré and domestic terrorist agitators. The 
Nigerian police must be the primary control mechanism in the detection and discovery of terrorist 
activities.  The force must be equipped with the latest technology and manpower needed to detect 
and investigate terrorists.  This could be done by methodological aggressive involvement of the 
citizens.  Unlike previous beliefs that terrorists are not well-informed, recent accounts remind us 
that they are intelligent and some are equipped with college education (Onwudiwe 2007). 
Detection and observation of terrorists are important in that detection serves as the link between 
observation and investigation. Every terrorist network operates in three phases: RESEARCH, 
PLANNING, AND EXECUTION. Terrorist research can be thwarted by detection, planning by 
discovery and execution by observation, detection and discovery (O’Connor 2009). 
The Nigerian police must be adequately trained in the detection response plan, which may 
include vigilance by local government to local government arrangements, house to house basis, 
and state by state basis.  But this could only be done properly and effectively if the police are closer 
to the people that they police.  This is why one of the author’s called for the decentralization of the 
Nigerian police (Onwudiwe, 2001), and local police formations (Onwudiwe 2009). The police and 
the people must work together, and this is important for any peacekeeping operations.  Once the 
people are friendly with their police, they are more amenable to provide the police with the 
information needed to apprehend terrorists before they strike. 
Recently, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the U.S. Department of 
Defense organized a small number of scholars from Europe and American academy to consult and 
suggest ways to improve African security (Perry and Borchard 2010). It was suggested that proper 
use of community policing frame will aid in maintaining African security.  The same principles 
articulated by the team of scholars will work well in Nigeria as presented below. 
The team of scholars observed that certain principle-level lessons learned about community 
policing from other contexts (i.e. what approaches worked and what did not) can be applied to the 
Nigerian contexts.  Some principles that are the foundation of other’s community policing (CP) 
approaches (China, Belgium, United Kingdom, USA) which might strengthen Nigerian CP include 
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the implementation of a police training component to improve and maintain professionalism and 
helping them be co-producers of justice with the community in order to prevent crime, terrorism, 
and kidnapping. As many of these problems manifest in Africa, and Nigeria, in particular, there 
may be a potential to consider what other non-African countries have done to address these issues 
through CP approaches and tailor them to the Nigerian situation (Wisler an Onwudiwe 2009).  
Fundamentally, CP is based on the recognition that citizens are co-producers of crime prevention 
and that good police-citizens are required to do this.  The information they provide to the police is 
the foundation of solving crimes, arresting offenders, preventing disorder, and, in some cases, 
countering terrorism and kidnapping. Given the primacy of good relations and effective 
information exchange in ensuring successful CP, the CP approach minimizes the use of force by 
the military.    
Four problems identified in counter-terrorism operations that rely on the use of the military in 
the West are:  
1. Western democracies carry an aversion to military forces used to deal with domestic 
problems.  The use of the military in a police role in the U.S. is a violation of federal law. 
2. The use of the military power to deal with terrorism has frequently been associated with 
the rise of repressive regimes, particularly across the Americas.  Often, the repressive 
regimes linger long after the terrorist threat has subsided. 
3. Military units may employ specialized tactical units who engage in anticipatory and 
retaliatory strikes.  Yet, many argue that such strikes lead to a cycle of violence, in which 
terror is meted out by both sides in never-ending conflict.  
4. The debate over the proper use of the military in civilian affairs is often rancorous.  The 
debate particularly focuses on the use of unconventional military tactics aimed at terrorist 
groups, and the ‘fair play’ implications of those tactics (White 2009). 
 In Africa, however, many states still rely on their militaries to provide their internal 
security.  In addition to African militaries being political tools of the state and protectors of the 
regime and its political interests (a situation that is true with Nigeria), militaries more generally 
provide internal security within the state as they are, more often than not, the only available tool 
for this purpose.  Given this situation, one needs to understand the central role and relatively high 
status of African militaries when examining the ways in which and the degree to which such 
militaries might consider their force options to maintain internal security within their respective 
territories as well as possible implications on African governments’ decisions to disband and/or 
eliminate their militaries and develop less-lethal security forces to serve this purpose.   
  African militaries are the only means by which most African governments can maintain 
internal state security.  In the African context, the question of whether the military is the most 
effective tool with which to maintain internal security is not asked because it is the only tool 
available.  Even though training is lacking in Africa in comparison to the West, African militaries 
are usually the only security forces in Africa that receive any training and therefore are the most 
capable entities in providing security through lethal and/or non/less-than-lethal means.  But 
regardless of the use of the military to stop terrorist and insurgent groups in Nigeria, sporadic 
killings of Nigerians continue unabated.  While White did not reject totally the use of the military 
in troubled situations, he suggested that governments should be cautionary and use the army only 
discretely (White 2002).   
Austin Turk (2002) on the other hand, is supportive of the use of the military force in 
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counter-terrorism. Turk suggests that there are three options in counter-terrorism such as the 
application of individual justice against terror networks, treating terror networks as if they were a 
nation and apply globally recognized rule of law, and believing that the enemy is a special danger 
that requires extraordinary military measures.  Turk favors the last option for the treatment of 
terrorists. This reality calls for reforms.  The following recommendations will help to address the 
insecurities in Nigeria without reliance on the military: 
a. Develop criminological and security institutes, a form of think-tank across the nations’ 
colleges and universities based on competitive funding announcements.  These institutes 
will conduct research and propose strategies to ameliorate the problems of insecurities in 
the country. 
b. Encourage and fund Nigerian scholars to develop terrorism research institutes that will 
focus on counter domestic, émigré, and international terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, 
and kidnappings in the country. 
c. Expand security agencies to admit and recruit fresh students and youths into their ranks.  
Expansion of the military population, police, and other security agencies and personnel 
will create more gainful job opportunities for our people. 
d. Decentralize the Nigerian Police and encourage local police formations that still are   
answerable to the center. 
e. Create rules that will mandate the Nigerian police to develop and establish community 
policing units that will be closer to the people and for intelligence purposes without 
undermining the cultures of the land. 
f. Pass laws that will make it illegal to expropriate Nigerian resources abroad and focus on 
hiring Nigerian consultants rather than relying on Euro, Asian, and American Experts. 
g. Fund and mandate Nigerian universities to establish criminological and criminal justice 
academic programs as was done in other developed nations such as the United States in the 
1960s. 
 
It is our fervent belief that the Nigerian police, if properly funded and trained, will, indeed, 
work hand in hand with the people to slow the tidal wave of terrorism.  Nigerians are good people 
and suicide terrorist bombings may not the part of the hallmark of the Nigerian character.  In a 
situation where the police officer is underpaid or the department has limited resources to operate, 
things will continue to be bad and the citizens will continue to suffer the scourge of terrorism.  
Nigerians do not deserve to be unsafe.  It is the social contract responsibility of the government to 
keep the people safe.  The government cannot afford to fail in this remarkable responsibility due 
to lack of the development of localized intelligence organizations.  
 
 
Counter-Terrorism Measure II:  Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
In this sphere of our second remedy, we must underscore that good intelligence is the most 
important repertoire of action in the fight against terrorism.  Good intelligence comes from good 
policing that recognizes the integration of the philosophy and principles of community policing 
frame.  Good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism (O’Connor 2009).  This means that 
understanding the tenets of community policing is crucial in the war against terrorism since CP 
focuses on pro-action rather re-action in police work.  This analysis means that for law enforcement 
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and the citizens alike, it is better to prevent terrorism than to investigate it. For law enforcement 
agencies that are well funded, intelligence is the initial level in the fight against domestic terrorism.  
The integration of the human factor is crucial in the protection of Nigerians and the Nigerian 
visitors such as the foreign business personnel and quests of the Nigerian nation. In this way, 
counter-terrorism intelligence by the Nigerian police must entail more than covert intelligence 
gathering and prevention. This necessitates that it must be broadened to encompass activities such 
as covert and overt detection, interruption of plots, intelligence risk analysis, target hardening, 
community enlistment, protection of persons and infrastructure, emergency assistance to the 
people, order-maintenance during and after an attack, easing of damage, and professional 
investigation of incidents (O’Connor 2009; White 2002). 
For Nigeria to be effective in preventing internal insurgencies in its desire to wipe out low 
intensity warfare, she must be willing to expend with resources directed to hiring freshly minted 
graduates from Nigerian universities, recruitment of top quality professionals in Nigeria including 
Nigerians in the Diaspora for the gathering and maintenance of intelligence data.  The enforcement 
agencies need resources to hire top trained intelligence analysts that will maintain both covert and 
overt collection of data. The development of police strategy in Nigeria must center on police 
intelligence skills that will enable the force to effectively anticipate or deal with the devastating 
events of domestic terrorism. Police efforts must include the ability to develop knowledge about 
probable future events and rapidly respond to surprises. In the contemporary technological age, 
societies are dealing with increasingly more complex environments.  If an organization is to 
effectively use intelligence to prepare for the discontinuities of terrorism, it must take a long look 
at the role of the intelligence function (Underwood 2002). With an increasing world of Sufism and 
terror networks with capacities to spread terror messages, the police cannot afford to conduct 
business as usual. 
Frank Gregory (2005) states that intelligence in counter-terrorism programs must include 
three fundamental factors: (1) its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity; (2) its role 
in post-incident investigations; and (3) its contribution to preventive/protective security measures. 
In his examination of the British counter-terrorism strategies, Gregory observes that the UK should 
focus on (Gregory 2005): 
 (1) Prevention – addressing underlying causes of terrorism here and overseas. That means, among 
other things, ensuring that Muslim citizens enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to 
participate to the full in British society.  
(2) Pursuit – using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. The UK has 
increased joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement 
agencies across the world. At home, the government aims to make UK borders more secure, 
to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources.  
(3) Protection – ensuring that reasonable security precautions, including those needed to meet a 
CBRN threat, are in place, ranging from physical measures at airports to establishing Counter-
Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) in each police force.  
(4) Preparedness – making sure that the UK has the people and resources in place to respond 
effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack.  
Nigeria can equally use these parameters of security identified by Gregory (2005) above for 
preventing terrorism in the UK (Gregory 2005).  Particularly, it is crucial for Nigeria to deny 
terrorists the funding necessary to fuel their terrorist missions. 
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Counter-Terrorism Measure III:  Information Sharing and Financial Intelligence 
Hapsburg General Raimondo Montecuccoli once asserted in the seventeenth century that a 
country needed three items to wage war: money, money, and more money (White 2009). This 
adage is applicable to terrorism as terrorists cannot survive today and be successful with terror 
campaigns without adequate financial resources. Organized political suicide missions cannot be 
sustained without money.  Modernity has changed the face of terrorism in that terrorists can now 
conduct their operations faster than they have done in the past due to technological innovations 
(Black 2004). The manner in which technology aids modernity is the same way it affects the 
network operations of terrorists. In short, money transfers by terrorists and the movement of funds 
and effective communication systems have transfigured the financial world. 
This analysis applies to the domestic terrorists in Nigeria.  The government must therefore 
close any loopholes that exist to make it difficult for Nigerian terror networks to get funding.  This 
can be done by first monitoring domestic activities of the suspected financiers of Nigerian 
terrorists.  The banks must be integrated in this effort.  In this case, information sharing becomes 
absolutely necessary. The Nigerian intelligence and all arms of the national security apparatus 
must be mandated to share information. This has been done in America after the horrors of 
September 11, 2001. The government reorganized the American National Security under the 
umbrella of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  The CIA, FBI, the state police, and 
indeed, all the arms of the security and intelligence are required to share information.  Since then, 
although one author stated that America is still vulnerable to terrorism (Flynn 2004), the fact 
remains that the American homeland is better defended today than prior September 2001 (White 
2009).  
But it will be naivety to expect and assume that Nigerian terrorists are only sponsored by 
Nigerian financiers.  Efforts also must be made to monitor and investigate the activities of foreign 
governments, groups, businesses, religious institutions, and charitable organizations.  To protect 
Nigeria from organized sponsors of insecurities, the government must work boldly and integrate 
individuals that will advise the State to fight the battle and to win it.  This is a vital and cardinal 
responsibility of the State. Given the reality that Nigerians are now willing to kill other Nigerians 
and foreigners (bombing of the UN office in Abuja, for example) the government has no choice 
but to place the defense of the Nigerian Homeland in the hands of a massive national security 
establishment that will integrate citizen trust in order to keep a round- the- clock vigilance of the 
country. There is an obvious clear and present danger facing our country and all hands of the law 
and citizenship must be on deck to fight terror.   
We conclude this frame of counter financial measure against terrorism by mentioning 
briefly some criminological examples in the literature.  The federal government must be vigilant 
about the creation of new banks in the country.  Adams (1986) insists that the most effective 
method to stop terrorism was to stop the flow of money.  Adams focused on banking and organized 
crime to illustrate his view.  He pointed out that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) ran 
its own banking system. He also indicated that the IRA made a “Capone discovery,” in which it 
established organized crime syndicates to finance operations. Other scholars pointed to the 
establishment of grocery stores to fund operations (Kushner and Jacobson 1998); transfer of illegal 
contrabands (Hinnen 2004), and illegal business laundering millions of dollars (Navis 2002). 
Noting these research reports, it is important to know that tracing the movement of funds is an 
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essential component of counter-terrorism measure.  The Nigerian federation must reject the 
approval and bogus establishment of new banks and must be willing to watch the emergence of 
new businesses and organized crime networks through efficient and effective forensic accounting 
techniques and use of legal prosecution.   
 
Counter-Terrorism Measure IV:  Prosecution of Terrorists and Civil Law Actions 
Our final approach to the control of terrorism in Nigeria is through the legal prosecution of 
Nigerian terrorists and their sponsors.  We argue that a determined Nigeria shall prosecute out of 
existence the terrorists and their financial patrons. It is noteworthy that civil action by private 
citizens has been effective against domestic terrorism (Smith 1994; O’Connor 2009). In Terrorism 
in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, Smith (1994) demonstrated how the U.S. attorneys 
successfully prosecuted leaders of domestic terrorists with the maximum imprisonment permitted 
by law (Smith 1994). In addition, because the networks and their leaders were civilly held 
responsible, they were prosecuted to oblivion financially.  Imagine a situation where Nigerian 
citizens affected by the spate of terrorism were allowed to prosecute these terrorists and their 
sponsors.  Monetary awards to the victims of terrorism will lead to the bankruptcy of the networks 
and their investors.  As we aforementioned, without money, they cannot operate. Therefore, 
criminal and civil prosecution of terrorists in Nigeria will be an effective countermeasure with the 
desire to prevent terrorism and save Nigerian lives.  Nigeria must be willing to seize the assets and 
all wealth belonging to the terrorists and their benefactors.  Foreign sponsor’s assets and money 
must also be seized.  Their lucrative business holdings must be sold and the proceeds should be 
distributed to compensate the Nigerian victims and their families.  Nigeria must fight fire with fire. 
On the international front, Nigeria should consider a possible severance of diplomatic 
relations with foreign nations that support terrorism on its soil. Smith reported that President 
Reagan retaliated against Libya when there was a “smoking gun” that Libya authorized a strike 
against American servicemen in West Germany on April 5, 1986 that claimed two American lives.  
Because of this, the U.S. launched a retaliatory strike against Libyan targets in Tripoli and 
Benghazi.  We mention this one incident just to illustrate the extent to which a country can act 
when the lives of its citizens are threatened and destroyed by the covert activities of other sovereign 
nations.  Nigerians must take the same bold steps otherwise the Nigeria we know will never be 
safe again and certainly will become a safe haven for terrorist radical sects’ and émigré terrorists, 
that is, foreign born terrorist’s resident in Nigeria.   
 
Discussion 
As Flynn (2004) rightfully noted that America is still vulnerable to terrorism, Nigeria with 
its own infinite might is also vulnerable to determined terrorist acts against the Nigerian people 
(Flynn 2004). What remains in the face of this obvious reality is what is to be done by the 
government and the people to stem the tidal wave of the scourge of terrorism.  We have articulated 
in this brief treatise the repertoire of actions necessary to combat terrorism and senseless violence 
and kidnapping in Nigeria.  We opine that in order to prevent terrorism, Nigeria must take bold 
actions without hesitation using the instruments of the government, particularly, the intelligence 
machinery of the government to control terrorism.  It is our view that to successfully control 
domestic and émigré terrorism in Nigeria that the police must be at the forefront of the fight.  The 
Nigerian police units must be well funded to integrate the communities within their various 
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jurisdictions to detect and capture Nigerian terrorists. Intelligence gathering through citizen 
cooperation has been found to work well in countries such as Japan that have scrupulously 
integrated its citizens in their police work. 
In a situation where citizens are made part of security participants, intelligence will follow 
naturally for the police and the police will build trust with the polity.  The use of the military is not 
the answer to counter-terrorism alone without active participants of the communities and police 
work.  Assuredly, we also propose that the government should fund and encourage the 
development of security and criminologically focused research institutes at various Nigerian 
universities.  These institutes will have a mandate to be co-producers of justice like the members 
of the ordinary citizens.  In addition, the Nigerian federal government must encourage the 
development of criminal justice preprograms, police institutes, and fund the Nigerian police for 
the development of more police training programs.  Most important, the Nigerian government must 
open the military and other security agencies such as the police to recruit and employ more 
graduates from Nigerian universities and abroad.  Unless the youths can regain their consciousness 
through gainful employment, they will continue to be vulnerable to brainwashing by radical 
terrorist adherents.  Employment opportunities are a major key to the fight against domestic 
terrorism whether it stems from the North or from the South. 
While one can find skirmishes of these ideas in this piece, we articulated clearly four 
repertoires of actions that we believe if adhered to will help Nigeria control the menace of 
terrorism. Given more than 20 years of experience in writing and studying terrorism, it is our view 
that we have provided ideas that are popular and that have been proven to work.  Community 
policing, decentralization of the Nigerian police and authentic local security formations, whether 
formal or informal (Onwudiwe 2007; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009) will, indeed, bring the police 
closer to the citizens than they are today.  It will help bring terrorists to justice and once again will 
make Nigeria safe for its populations.  
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These actions will include, but are not limited to, traditional criminal investigations and 
discovery techniques in law enforcement, the role of intelligence and smart policing with an 
emphasis on good community policing frames, information sharing among agencies of social 
control and financial intelligence, and the ultimate goal of prosecuting domestic terrorists using 
the dictates of the law. It is proposed that through these strategies and techniques, the Nigerian 
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terrorists can be prosecuted out of existence if the government could deplete their pecuniary 
capital.  Finally, while it is good to use these law enforcement strategies to defend the homeland, 
we argue throughout the paper for a system to understand the root causes of terrorism, 
kidnappings and various forms of agitations in Nigeria.  Without addressing the fundamental 
problems of unemployment of the youth and an understanding of the causes of historical 
insecurities in various regions of the country, the future of security in Nigeria will remain 
oblique.  Tables and diagrams are introduced based on data collected by the World Terrorism 
data base to illustrate the distribution of terrorism in Nigeria. 
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